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US-China trade

China’s BRI and the US response: Contest in the Caribbean


Published 11 June 2024

The global contest between the US and China for geopolitical influence often assumes that local governments lack agency or are completely oblivious to the risks of doing business with each respective side. In reality, many economies seek to maximize benefits from both superpowers. As China expands its activities in what Biden now refers to as the US’ “front yard”, the Caribbean, Washington must continue to take concrete steps to respond effectively.

The conventional Western perspective of the Caribbean usually fails to capture the entirety of the region’s narrative. The Caribbean is as diverse as any other in the world – with unique histories, languages, and cultures. Yet, it is bound together by shared challenges such as limited access to development finance, rising sea levels, powerful storms, food insecurity, gang violence, and cyberattacks. Unfortunately, Caribbean leaders consistently express frustration over feeling neglected by the Western governments and development finance institutions (DFIs).

The Caribbean is often called the US’ "third border" as it is a vital commercial hub and transit area for international trade and logistics, serving the eastern coast of the US as well as the Atlantic side of Central and South America. The region is also a strategic beachhead for the US, vulnerable to money laundering, and a potential staging post for undersea cables, intelligence gathering, and high-tech rivalry.

In just two decades, China has significantly increased its DFI presence in conjunction with state-owned enterprise projects through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, China has developed comprehensive partnerships with most Caribbean countries. While several regional leaders extol increased Chinese presence, Western observers have raised concerns about the potential risks such engagement may bring.

Should the US worry about increased Chinese presence in the Caribbean? What measures can the US and its European allies take to become better partners? In this report, authors Earl Carr and Leland Lazarus delve into China’s engagement in the Caribbean across various sectors including trade, lending, renewable energy, law enforcement, and technology, before concluding with a list of actionable recommendations on how the US can improve its own engagement in the region. Rather than dismissing China’s strategic objectives in the Caribbean, the authors argue, it is more important that the US strengthens its diplomatic presence and provide alternatives grounded in the rule of law, public-private partnerships, cultural competence, transparency, and adherence to environmental, social, and governance best practices.

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Author

Earl Carr

Earl Carr is the Founder and Chief Executive Officer of CJPA Global Advisors. Mr. Carr has over 25 years of experience in wealth management, commercial banking, strategy, marketing, consulting, education, international development, and research & development.

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Leland Lazarus is the Associate Director of National Security at FIU's Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy. An expert on China-Latin America relations, he leads a research team on U.S. national security in Latin America and the Caribbean.

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