**Introduction** If World Trade Organization (WTO) special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions are scaled back, smaller developing countries would face increased exposure to uniform trade obligations that exceed their institutional and administrative capacity. The principal risks include reduced policy space for development, higher implementation and compliance costs, limited ability to enforce rights under WTO rules, and greater vulnerability to trade distortions arising from policies adopted by larger economies. **Contextual background** S&DT provisions are incorporated across WTO agreements and provide flexibilities such as extended implementation periods, technical assistance, and differentiated commitments for developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs). The WTO identifies more than 150 S&DT provisions across its agreements, including measures specific to LDCs[1][2]. Current reform discussions increasingly focus on differentiation among developing members, raising the possibility that certain S&DT provisions could be narrowed, time-bound, or subject to additional conditions[3][4]. **Key risks for smaller developing countries** **1.** **Reduced development policy space** Scaling back S&DT limits the ability of smaller developing economies to sequence liberalization, support industrialization, and diversify exports. S&DT provisions form part of the WTO framework intended to allow developing members to integrate into the global trading system at a pace consistent with institutional capacity and development priorities[5]. A reduction in these flexibilities increases the likelihood that adjustment costs — particularly those associated with industrial upgrading and sustainability-related requirements — are front-loaded in ways that exceed domestic absorptive capacity[6]. **2.** **Higher compliance and administrative costs** Smaller administrations face disproportionately high fixed costs in meeting notification, transparency, and regulatory obligations. When S&DT flexibilities are reduced, compliance costs are more likely to function as de facto barriers to trade participation, particularly in areas such as customs procedures, technical standards, and documentation. Policy uncertainty and rising trade barriers tend to have a disproportionate impact on capacity-constrained economies, reinforcing the importance of targeted flexibilities and support mechanisms[7]. In the context of the green transition, the absence of adequate capacity building and phased implementation increases the risk that developing countries are excluded from emerging trade opportunities[8]. **3.** **Weaker enforcement capacity** Scaling back S&DT may push smaller developing members toward fuller reciprocal commitments without a corresponding improvement in their ability to enforce rights under WTO rules. S&DT-related flexibilities form part of the framework that enables developing and least-developed members to participate effectively in a rules-based trading system[2]. This asymmetry is compounded by limited retaliation capacity and the high legal and administrative costs associated with dispute settlement. Poorly calibrated changes to S&DT risk weakening negotiating balance and undermining confidence in the institutional legitimacy of the multilateral trading system[4]. **Conclusion** Scaling back S&DT provisions creates asymmetric adjustment risks for smaller developing countries, as capacity constraints and enforcement limitations remain binding. The principal risks include reduced policy space for development, higher implementation and compliance costs that increase exclusion risks, and a weaker ability to defend trade rights in an environment characterized by persistent trade distortions. S&DT reform that is not closely aligned with capacity-based differentiation and effective support mechanisms would therefore increase vulnerability for the smallest and most capacity-constrained WTO members.
