Reexamining the commerce control list; Commerce control list items

The CCL is transforming as advanced technologies are added to BIS controls; items on the CCL should be reviewed and revised more frequently given rapidly changing technologies, evolving threats, and diversifying capabilities; reviews should consider the capabilities of countries of concern to make items without US input and the role of economic partners and allies in supporting control policies; the review should divide items according to whether export controls should be loosened or sustained/tightened. (p. 22)
A review of the controls in place should consider the impact on the US, allies, and actors of concern, including effects on US technological capabilities and R&D, US industry competitiveness, and US security interests; alignment with allied and multilateral export control regimes and whether it would enhance or undercut allied industries and security interests or affect cooperation with the US; and whether an action would prevent countries of concern from sourcing the restricted item from abroad or indigenously. (pp. 23-24)
Many items on the CCL are also controlled under multilateral export control regimes, including four of which the US is a member: the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use goods), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nuclear material and related technologies), the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons and related goods), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (missiles and related technologies); all coordinate export controls and stop proliferation of sensitive technologies to actors and end users of concern without identifying target countries; the US is also a party to UN Security Council arms embargoes on particular countries or regions; multilateral controls reduce the number of suppliers of arms to actors of concern making controls more effective overall. (pp. 24-25)
CCL items are either subject to multilateral controls (in addition to US controls) or controlled unilaterally; BIS can more easily add or remove unilaterally controlled items from the CCL; for multilaterally controlled items the US must seek consensus to add or remove them from controls which is more complicated and could require Congressional approval; if the US wishes to remove an item from control without consensus multilaterally it could choose to loosen controls with the risk of undermining the control regime. (pp. 25-26)
Items currently on the CCL primarily related to health and safety (i.e. fire extinguishers and life jackets) can be decontrolled now to free up BIS licensing and enforcement capabilities; items not controlled by US allies, that countries of concern can also easily design and manufacture, and that are not essential to functioning of a military item can be removed from the CCL without damage to US national security or harm to US manufacturers. (pp. 27-28, Table 3)

Table 3: Sample Items to Decontrol on the CCL

In reviewing items for potential decontrol, BIS should consider whether the presence of the US, its allies, and partners is large enough in a specific good’s market to make controls effective, taking into account foreign availability as well as a critical analysis of where the US falls in the market landscape, i.e. leading or falling behind. (pp. 28-30)
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can play a significant role in both commercial and defense applications and are controlled under the MTCR and by the UK, Canada, EU and the US for the potential to deliver nuclear and other controlled technologies; the US and Israel are the largest producers and sellers of UAVs with China emerging as a major producer and exporter and the world leader in combat UAVs; CCL controls should be tailored to the technology margins where the US maintains a leading edge but loosened where China dominates the market to allow US firms to compete. (pp. 30-31)
Field program gate arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits that can be configured for special functions in the field without hardware replacements or modifications so have wide applications, including in military systems and critical infrastructure; FPGAs are controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement and Canada, the UK, EU, and the US to limit proliferation of sensitive technologies; FGPAs are made with components and expertise from multiple countries so maintaining export controls can disrupt US technological progress; the US has a technological lead in the advanced market while China is performing well in the low-end market and making advancements in high-end capacity; US export controls should adapt to China’s dominance in legacy products while curbing China’s ability to obtain advanced design and manufacturing capabilities. (pp. 31-32)
Radiation-hardened electronic components are components, CPUs, and sensors that are less susceptible to damage from exposure to radiation and extreme temperatures and are used in the aerospace, defense, nuclear, and medical industries; they are subject to US export controls and the Wassenaar Arrangement; North American companies dominate the market, with the Asia-Pacific market growing at the highest rate, bolstered by research in China, India, and Japan, with China investing heavily in producing and indigenizing these products; current US primacy in this sector makes controls workable in coordination with allied governments. (pp. 32-33)
Machine tools cut, shear, and cast metal and other materials to create products and parts and are increasingly sophisticated, creating intricate technologies and electronics with use in both commercial and defense sectors; exports are controlled by the CCL, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; Asia is the largest market for machine tools; Japan, Germany, and the US are the largest producers of machine tools but many of their companies have production in China; China is currently incapable of producing certain high-end machine tools despite growth of R&D there; controls on high-end machine tools are workable because of US and allied dominance so long as the US takes a multilateral approach to controls working closely with Japan and Germany, who dominate global supply. (pp. 33-34)
Lasers are used in medical, commercial, telecom, scientific, and defense industries with a wide range of applications; lasers are subject to US export controls and controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; Asia is the largest market with China the largest component of the market; China has laser technology comparable to the US and allied countries, with the US and its allies maintaining some control and a technological advantage over lasers in high-end applications like EUV lithography and lidar; given China’s growing hold of the lidar sector and the US imperative to remain competitive and a global leader in lidar, BIS should loosen controls to provide commercial opportunities to US firms in the sector. (pp. 34-35)
Advanced materials are materials or substances with unique properties or applications in advanced technologies; polyimides are synthetic polymers that possess superior strength, thermal stability, and resistance to radiation, so are used in aerospace and military applications (i.e. Kevlar); the UK, EU, Canada, the US and the Wassenaar Arrangement all control various polyimides; Asia is the largest market for polyimides while US and allied firms are the dominant suppliers; US controls are still effective but BIS should review controls frequently based on thickness, with thicker polyimides more important for control; looser controls on thinner products would allow US firms more competitive opportunities. (pp. 35-36)
Aviation testing equipment are tools used to maintain aircraft hydraulic and electronic systems; equipment is subject to export controls to ensure it is not diverted to entities of concern for military purposes; Asia is the largest market and fastest-growing region; China is working to develop its indigenous capacity but has not caught up to industry leaders like the US, giving US export control authorities more leeway in influencing China’s rise in this sector; tight US controls are warranted to restrict Chinese access to technologies that enable China to build a domestic aviation industry and capabilities. (pp. 36-37)