Four months from the World Trade Organization’s 14th Ministerial Conference in Cameroon, talk is rife of nerves running high over the pivotal gathering, coming amid the thick of chaos and distrust in multilateral trade. The worry is that MC14 might not deliver or be perceived as a failure.

I can imagine the conversations in the hallways and fabled atrium of the WTO’s Centre William Rappard in Geneva. We need a ministerial outcomes document! We need to finalize Fish 2!¹ We need to have a robust reform agenda! We need to finally deliver on agriculture! We need to deliver for development, for Least Developed Countries, for Small Vulnerable Economies! We need to renew our vows to Most-Favoured-Nation!… We are getting close to the holiday season and the Christmas tree-ing is surely alive and well.

Don’t get me wrong, I do hope that MC14 is a success. I understand the worries, but I believe it can be a success. Here are some ways.

Taking a step back, let’s remind ourselves why WTO members go through this ritual every two years. Simply put, it’s because the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO states that “[t]here shall be a Ministerial Conference composed of representatives of all the Members, which shall meet at least once every two years”.² The Ministerial Conference is the highest decision-making body of the WTO. It is both a body (comprised of the trade ministers of the members) and an event (the convening of those ministers). Importantly, in between the Ministerial events, all the functions of the Ministerial Conference are carried out by the General Council based in Geneva, usually composed of ambassadors of all the member-countries.³

But Marrakesh doesn’t tell us much more about the Ministerial Conference as an event. Yes, decisions can be taken at MCs, but it doesn’t say that any particular decision needs to be taken or that any particular document needs to be issued.

So, one outcome of a “successful” Ministerial Conference is that ministers meet, have face-to-face conversations on critical topical issues, and leave with a better understanding (hopefully) of where each stands. One wonders whether that is a good way to spend taxpayers’ monies on the traveling delegations as well as the host government of ministerial events that amount to nothing. But there is value in face-to-face meetings.

I am not advocating for MC14 to be merely a talk-fest. And I certainly hope that the temptation to turn MC14 into a collective “let’s complain about U.S. tariffs” fest will be resisted. No doubt conversations will be had, but this Ministerial Conference should, and can, have a positive outcome, not a negative one. If approached and prepared correctly, this Ministerial Conference can have critically needed results for the sake of the organization and the development agenda.

First, members need to avoid the always-present temptation to overload the Ministerial agenda. You cannot take every issue to Ministers. This is a recipe for failure, which we have seen before. I understand why this is hard. Everyone has their own priorities, and no one wants to let go of their issue until the very end. The notion that the only way to get agreement is to package all these disparate things into a “single undertaking” – meaning nothing is agreed until everything is agreed – does not work anymore. There are simply too many things, too many old items on the agenda.

If members really want to reform the WTO, they need to reform their approach first.

One way to come at this is to focus on one or two issues that are basically “yes or no” questions.

First up should be the permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions (the so-called e-commerce moratorium). If not extended by the end of MC14, currently scheduled to close on 29 March, the moratorium will expire. While action could be taken by the General Council before then, it is highly unlikely it will preempt MC14. People like drama!

This is not the place for arguing the benefits of the moratorium. The moratorium has wide support among the WTO membership, including the developing world. However, traditionally, it has faced opposition from a few, yet vocal and powerful players. At the last Ministerial Conference, Indonesia’s opposition, after India had sided with consensus to extend the moratorium, delayed the closing of the conference.

Significantly, the United States under the Trump administration not only supports the adoption of a permanent moratorium, but has actively pursued commitments from trading partners for their support of a permanent moratorium.⁴ Such commitments have been included in agreements with Indonesia, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The significance of this cannot be overstated. Here is an area where the Trump administration is fully supportive of a positive outcome at the WTO and a positive outcome for multilateralism. This should hopefully bring members together, not apart. This is a gettable win for the WTO and for global trade and economic development, unless members fall back into the old habits of using this as a bargaining chip.⁵ The permanent extension of the e-commerce moratorium can be a win for all.

Next up, incorporating the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA) to Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement, the part of the WTO’s legal architecture that houses plurilateral trade agreements. Since the Marrakesh Agreement established the WTO in 1995, not a single plurilateral agreement has entered its Annex 4. The plurilaterally negotiated IFD Agreement enjoys the support of 128 out of the WTO’s 166 members. The United States is the only developed country not to participate in the negotiation of this agreement. That said, as the prior U.S. ambassador to the WTO, I publicly stated the United States would not object to this agreement being incorporated into Annex 4. I am not aware that the U.S. position on this has changed.

Opposition to the agreement by a few members – mostly the same vocal and powerful ones that sought to bury the e-commerce moratorium – mainly centers on generalized opposition to plurilateral initiatives. As a matter of law, I believe opponents of plurilaterals are wrong, but this is not the place for legal debates. As a practical matter, there is a way to move forward.

This takes me to the issue of the WTO’s decision-making by “the practice of consensus”⁶. In many conversations, consensus is confused with unanimity. Consensus does not require everyone to say yes; it requires that no one raises their hand to say no. It is the difference between affirmatively agreeing and not objecting (even if you don’t necessarily agree).

I am sympathetic to those who worry that not objecting to something at the WTO means that you will be under pressure, maybe relentless pressure, to join or support at some later point in time. Even worse, joining a consensus for a plurilateral agreement to move forward could be interpreted (it is feared) as agreeing to a “mandate” for that issue (even if it does not create an obligation on you). This issue of “mandates” is one that has bedeviled the WTO for some time.⁷

There is a practical and simple solution to this. Instead of objecting, a member can agree to join a consensus on the express and on-the-record understanding that the member undertakes no obligations to join the particular agreement or that consenting to let the agreement go ahead does not imply that the member has conceded that there is a multilateral mandate for the particular issue – in this case the IFDA.

This is not a novel idea but one that has not been given the serious consideration it should get, to my knowledge.

I have heard members who object to plurilaterals suggest that members should take those agreements outside the WTO. But that is no solution. Yes, members can do that if they want, but why should they? A big part of these initiatives hinges on the technical support you can get at the WTO and the transparency it provides for all members, even those not participating.

Operationalizing an arrangement like the one described above at MC14 would be a huge step forward for the membership. The vast majority of the developing-country members of the WTO support the IFDA. This, along with the permanent e-commerce moratorium, would deliver on two important pieces for the development agenda and potentially pave the way for handling divergences at the WTO more nimbly.

One final thought for a successful MC14. It is a cliché that we are living in very difficult times. There is no doubt that the United States is a source of much difficulty in the trade space.

But, as noted above, it is providing strong support for parts of the WTO agenda, in particular the e-commerce moratorium. Recently, China announced it would not seek special and differential treatment in future negotiations. This is painless – for now – but still a significant move on their part. It would be good to see other large economies (particularly “developing” economies) which have benefited from liberalized trade under the WTO take steps to demonstrate leadership in moving the WTO agenda forward. That would be a huge step forward to truly reforming the WTO.