The polls were wrong. Instead of a tight midterm election that might have increased Democratic control over half of the US Congress, Republicans lost in a landslide. The damage was not contained to the House of Representatives but included substantial victories for Democrats in the US Senate as well as in state races nationwide.

Voters clearly indicated their unhappiness with the direction of the country. At the top of the list of grievances were worries over inflation and affordability. Trade policy made a rare appearance in voter decisions with strong opposition from nearly all voters to the use of tariffs, particularly as used against Canada.

Early assessments of the impact of these historic elections have included many confident assertions that a newly empowered US Congress will rein in the President’s use of trade and tariff tools when it takes up office in January. This will not happen.

It is not that most members of the incoming Congress like tariffs, the overall direction of US trade policy under Trump, or the continuing usurpation of powers on trade that the Constitution says is to be held by the legislative branch. The key problem is that Congress is going to be relatively powerless to make changes and very busy managing a wide array of other foreign and domestic issues.

Despite a dominant performance in the elections, Democrats do not have sufficient strength to end a filibuster or blocking action on considering new legislation which requires 60 votes in the Senate or to override a potential US Presidential veto of any approved legislation which requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers (290 votes in the House plus 67 votes in the Senate). While some Republicans will feel chastened by the electoral results, they are unlikely to side with Democrats, especially against the key signature issue for the current leader of their party.

Trump loves tariffs. He has always argued that the use of tariffs will drive a manufacturing and investment renaissance. He has frequently argued that this economic adjustment will take time to fully materialize. He is unlikely to change his views on the wisdom of using tariffs and other punitive tools now.

Faced with obstacles by confident Democrats across the rest of his agenda in areas like immigration or health care, Trump is actually likely to double down on his overseas activities. This is a typical pattern for all presidents at the end of their term in office as foreign policy offers greater scope for unfettered actions than domestic policy. For Trump, expect him to return to his favorite foreign policy topic in trade and reach for his favorite tool, tariffs.

Congress is not powerless. Once the new body gets sworn into office early January, they can and probably will hold endless hearings and require senior administration officials to explain policy decisions. They can demand details about which companies received tariff exemptions or additional information about special investment-in-exchange-for-lower-tariff commitments. They can reinstate procedures for granting tariff exemptions which are more transparent and predictable. They can propose or even pass a wide array of bills to rein in the power of the President on trade which will surely be vetoed by Trump.

Members of Congress can also push hard for some changes. Given the depth of dislike by voters of all stripes to the war in Iran and the implications for oil prices and inflation, this is an obvious first area of focus. But also look for renewed pressure to revise other policies, such as the use of Section 338 against Canada. The actions against Canada proved particularly unpopular with voters, so there is a reasonable chance of these decisions on tariffs and even outright bans on imports getting reversed.

Congress is also likely to press for swift renewal of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) where talks have been stalled. Congress members and newly elected state officials are keenly aware of the economic importance of maintaining close economic ties with Canada and Mexico for all 50 US states. Democrats will be eager to show some quick results from their own promises of improving affordability for their constituents. But the upcoming fight over an extension of USMCA will show once again the divergence in views among many Democrats.

Members can request greater clarity on the administration’s plans for working with trade partners on existing and future trade deals like the various Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) negotiated over the past year. These agreements — which are not yet fully in force anywhere — were never presented to Congress for approval, nor did the legislative branch provide input to the negotiation processes.

But US trade partners looking for broader tariff relief next year are likely to be disappointed. Members of Congress are not going to change Section 301 for unfair trade practices or tighten the requirements for using Section 232 for national security. Any adjustments to these trade acts would require legal changes and would be subject to Presidential veto. There will be pressure, perhaps, for a longer-term review and potential repeal or adjustment of these statutes after 2028, as well as others like Section 122 for balance-of-payments concerns and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

There is also the difficult problem that neither party, Democrats nor Republicans, has clarity on their future trade preferences. Some Democrats are strongly opposed to protectionist actions including tariffs, while others are less hostile or even like the idea of using tariffs in a strategic way to support domestic production in key sectors. The party just won a resounding victory, although it is not clear how much of the win was about rejecting Trumpism and how much was supporting a wide array of Democratic positions.

Republicans have marched in lockstep with the President, but as attention already turns to the 2028 contests, some party members may be eying very different trade and economic policies. At a time of increasing federal budget shortfalls, cutting tariffs is likely to be challenging.

When parties switch control of Congress, they also realign the various committee structures to reflect the change in the majority power. All substantive work in the legislature gets done through committees which have oversight into everything from budget appropriations to farm policies. Because so many senior members of both parties have either stepped down or were swept out of office, Congress has an unusually high number of newcomers and fewer legislators with extensive committee experience. It remains an open question exactly what priorities new committees might set or how much enthusiasm they might show towards one agenda or another.

The size of the Democratic sweep increases the likelihood of some trade-related actions. For example, although Democrats are not yet aligned on many economic and foreign policy priorities, some traditional issues are likely to resurface. This includes greater support for climate-friendly or green transition actions.

Other policy positions, taken during prior democratically controlled periods, may no longer apply as the world has changed significantly over the past decade. For example, although Trump’s team dismantled the United States Agency for International Development and took apart most of the foreign aid programming that Democrats traditionally supported, it is highly unlikely that it will be rebuilt in the next two years or, potentially, ever.

Voters were extremely clear in their opposition to the continuing build-out of data centers. The top five US states for hosting centers all shifted to Democratic control, affecting an estimated 45% of planned expansion.¹ Voters directly approved 46 out of 47 data center-specific ballot initiatives to stop or slow construction projects.²

AI was not directly on the ballot in the same way, but voters remain skeptical of the benefits. Congress is likely to take up some form of AI regulation, although their overall room for maneuver may be limited if Trump continues to support the sector.

But AI regulation need not only take place in Washington. Various states are likely to put forward their own approaches to the sector. Many incoming governors have pledged to suspend or cancel permits for existing data centers. Any pause in construction will have knock-on implications for many US trade partners that have been receiving strong economic tailwinds in their own economies based on selling the hardware needed to power AI in the United States.

The magnitude of the loss for Republicans also opens up another interesting foreign and economic change opportunity. While it seems clear that President Trump has been quite eager to maintain stable relations with China, there are many others within and outside of his party who are far more hawkish. Up to this point, Trump has been able to largely restrain their requests for aggressive actions such as even higher tariffs on Chinese imports, additional export controls, or application of sanctions against China.

A seriously weakened Trump, however, may not be able to head off demands for harsher action vis-à-vis China in the next two years. There are a couple of relatively easy tools that restive members of Congress could insist on using.

One is the enforcement of legislation that Congress just passed in September, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (H.R. 5334 / S. 5025). This bill requires that the President impose economic sanctions against the top five buyers of Russian energy products. China is at the top of the list of potential targets.

There are also several deadlines looming quickly in ongoing trade actions. The Office of the United States Trade Representative has been preparing to release the results of its Section 301 investigation into alleged structural excess capacity against 16 trade partners, including China. The determination is likely to include more tariffs.

Trump’s other trade actions contain some important deadlines. The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security extended the deadline again last week to January 10 on the end-user affiliates rule. The planned policy would dramatically expand the list of companies covered by US export control restrictions and substantially increase the compliance requirements for firms. Tariffs against Canada under Section 338 are set to escalate again on January 1, absent an agreement or an extension. Lumber and furniture tariffs under Section 232 are to rise on December 31. Port fees for China-built, owned, or operated ships are due to increase on January 9 under a Section 301 determination which has already been extended once.

Several Section 232 investigations have been concluded with the recommendation that the US engage in negotiations. The set of required talks now includes semiconductor chips, critical minerals, commercial aircraft and jet engines, wind turbines, medical devices, robotics, and machine tools.

In short, while the size and scale of the midterm election results surprised everyone, the changes will not unleash a similarly unexpected pivot in US trade policies. Trump remains President with ample tools at his disposal to continue to deliver on his most important foreign policy priorities. The next two years are set to be a rocky ride.