On fisheries subsidies, New Delhi wants an agreement that would permit India and all developing countries to provide unlimited subsidies for any fishers operating within a country’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone. India further demands that Japan, European Union countries, the United States, and other developed countries agree to a 25-year ban on subsidies for fleets fishing in international waters.

But India’s number one objective is to extend and make permanent a provisional arrangement in which it buys grains from domestic farmers at above-market prices and stockpiles the grain for later distribution. A handful of other countries currently employ such a system – including China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

The Indians justifiably claim that ministers had pledged to come up with a permanent solution to such a scheme, known as "public stockholding", back in 2013 but have failed to do so since. WTO members have become wary of writing India – not to mention China – a blank check which could be used to support exports of rice. So far, India has twice exceeded its subsidies limits though the use of public stockholding, twice overshooting its support limit of $4.6 billion annually for rice. But the provisional agreement reached in 2013 shields India from any WTO action for breeching its subsidy limits. Today, opponents of the program argue that the public stockholding discussions should be held in the context of wider agriculture subsidy reform negotiations.

In January, the United States infuriated the Indians by saying there was no possibility of agreeing on a deal in Abu Dhabi to enshrine public stockholding. The chair of the agriculture negotiations, Alparslan Acarsoy of Turkiye, originally suggested that since no consensus had emerged thus far, public stockholding should be set aside until the next Ministerial Conference. Inclusion of this option in his negotiating text triggered a fierce Indian response which led him to revise the text and include two possible outcomes, one which calls for agreement in Abu Dhabi and one which sets the issue on a slower track.

But the writing is on the wall: there will be no deal on public stockholding in February. Given that India has plainly stated it will not discuss any other agriculture issues without a deal on public stockholding, there is unlikely to be agreement on any agriculture issue – in itself a symptom of the WTO’s decision-making sclerosis.

As important as the fisheries subsidies and agriculture negotiations are, the agenda issue which carries perhaps the greatest symbolic importance is the fate of the organization-wide moratorium on duties applied to electric commerce transactions. This moratorium has been in place since the 1998 Ministerial Conference and has been extended at every Ministerial Conference since. The importance of this issue to businesses around the world cannot be overstated. Business confidence in the WTO is at its lowest ebb on record and a ministerial outcome in which WTO members decide – for the first time – to raise tariffs would lead many, particularly in the United States, to disengage even further.