Identifying middle powers

Table 1 lists countries with shares between 1%-4% in both global goods and services trades¹. The US, China, and Germany are excluded as they have shares of more than 4% in both trades. Shares of non-EU countries are noted both as proportions of global trade including intra-EU trade and excluding it (in parentheses). Countries are also identified through the groups and blocs they belong to.

Findings and Implications

Almost all of the world’s 20 largest economies are in Table 1, except Russia, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. While the three economies have considerable geopolitical heft, their shares in global goods and services trades are not significant enough to make them key actors in shaping global trade rules.
Along with the G7 group of countries, several G20 members are in Table 1, with the exception of Argentina, Indonesia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. If middle powers need to come together for addressing the problems of global trade, the initiative might have to begin with the G20.
Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, Thailand, and the UAE – while not among the world’s top 20 largest economies – belong in the top 30. These countries are not in the G20, implying that galvanizing efforts by G20 middle powers will need to go beyond the group.
The Global South is represented through Brazil, India, Thailand, and Turkiye, though Mexico and UAE might also be so. The representation gets limited due to absence of developing-country G20 members – Argentina, Indonesia, and South Africa. This also explains the relatively low representation from BRICS. The middle power collective based on the studied identity will have lower contribution from the Global South.
European countries dominate Table 1. Seven EU economies – Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain – feature in the list, along with Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Asia follows with eight members – Australia, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and UAE. The two continents will be prominent in prospective middle-power initiatives.
Among regional trade blocs, the CPTPP has most members in Table 1 (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, and the UK). All CPTPP members, except the UK, also belong to APEC, making the latter well-represented, as it also includes Hong Kong, Korea, and Thailand.
The EU and APEC together account for 15 out of 21 countries in Table 1. Moreover, EU and CPTPP members, along with non-EU European countries, and non-CPTPP APEC members, account for almost all of Table 1, except Brazil, India, and the UAE. The EU-CPTPP combine can be noted as a distinct middle power grouping.

Can middle powers deliver?

A statistical definition for middle powers attempts to homogenize them apolitically. However, such a broadbrush doesn’t do away with other problems.

The most substantial challenge for middle powers in moving forward collectively is in locking on to a common agenda. The latter, arguably, is adhering to the rules-based global trade order and ensuring its reforms. While the first part of the agenda might be a shared objective, the latter will be interpreted through divergent priorities and can generate conflicts of interest, arising from differences in proficiencies and prominence of countries in global trade of goods vis-à-vis services. It is not clear how these conflicts might be resolved. Indeed, countries with large shares in both goods and services trades might themselves be confused over prioritizing their interests across the two spectrums.