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[1] See https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/us-china/how-trump-hardwired-21st-century-us-trade-policy/
[2] Trump has called for at least 60% or higher against China, https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/04/trump-floats-more-than-60percent-tariffs-on-chinese-imports.html. Trump called 10% tariffs a "ring around the collar" in August 2023 (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-08-24/supply-chain-latest-trump-proposes-universal-10-tariff) but has recently said tariffs on others could be 20% or more in https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/08/15/donald-trump-twenty-percent-tariff-economic-policy/74809155007/
[3] Clausing and Lovely, PIIE, https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2024/why-trumps-tariff-proposals-would-harm-working-americans UBS suggests that a 60% tariff would drop China’s growth rate in half. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-07-16/us-tariffs-at-60-would-halve-china-s-growth-rate-ubs-says
[4] See, for example, his August 19, 2024 comments as reported in Trump, joined by Lighthizer, says his tariff plan won’t raise prices | InsideTrade.com
[5] https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_CHAPTER-26.pdf The second chapter, written by Kent Lassman, attempts to align Project 2025 with more traditional Republican trade objectives
[6] The story is retold in https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/02/donald-trump-first-campaign-speech-new-hampshire-1987-213595/
[7] Interview with Diane Sawyer, quote from https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/tracing-trumps-aggressive-tariff-strategy-back-1980s-riddell-%E5%A4%A7%E5%AE%9D
[8] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
[9] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
[10] US unemployment is currently at a near record low, even while the bilateral trade deficit in goods remains high. This suggests that while trade flows might affect specific jobs in certain locations, the overall effect of trade on employment is modest. Gordon Hanson, writing in Foreign Affairs, notes that even if Lighthizer could increase the share of workers in manufacturing by 50% by the end of the decade, manufacturing would still only account for one in eight US jobs. See https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/washingtons-new-trade-consensus-hanson-lighthizer
[11] It is worth noting that most economists disagree. A trade deficit in goods is a function of national savings rates. For more details, see Maurice Obstfeld, Policy Brief 24-7: Misconceptions about US trade deficits muddy the economic policy debate (piie.com) Given the overwhelming importance of services to the US economy, it is surprising to note that these jobs barely make an appearance in Lighthizer’s book. Like Trump, apparently a lifetime of work in services and service industries cannot shake a visceral belief that goods matter more than services.
[12] https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/us-china/what-it-means-if-the-us-revokes-pntr-with-china/
[13] See page 192. The IEEPA was put into place in 1977 to allow sweeping economic sanctions in times of national emergencies. For a thorough review, see https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf
[14] https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2024/06/11/donald-trumps-trade-hawk-is-plotting-behind-bars
[15] RNC approves Republican Party platform with Trump trade proposals | InsideTrade.com